Panel discussion on Moldova in Berlin

On 7 March 2017, in Berlin, The German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP) and the Representation of the European Commission in Germany organised a panel discussion entitled “Moldova, the EU and the Struggle for Reforms - How to adjust the Eastern Partnership?”. The agenda comprised items like “Moldova caught between the EU and Russia”, “new president Dodon”, “dismay of current state of reforms”, “geopolitical struggle with Russia” and “further reforms in Moldova”. For the keynote speech was invited Andrian Candu, the Chairman of the Moldovan Parliament. He was the only speaker (mis-)representing Moldova. This is not an article. It is a collection of theses and side notes for an interactive conversation, intended as a counter-speech to the discourse of Mr Candu, as no opposition representative was invited to the forum.

Andrian Candu, Chairman of Moldovan Parliament,
godson of Plahotniuc and vice-chairman of his Democratic Party.

C o n t e n t s:

A. Three prefatory remarks

B. “Moldova between EU and Russia”

1. Russian impact over Moldova
2. Russian propaganda
3. Back to the key question

C. “Reforms“

1. Kernel
2. Same people
3. Diplomatic message
4. Key test
5. Simulation, imitation and fog in your eyes
6. “Fight” against corruption
7. Oligarchs or oligarch
8. Conditions

D. Conclusions

1. Captured state
2. The key problem
3. Central and secondary issues
4. Show attitude
5. What part the EU is on?

A. Two prefatory remarks 

1. Introversion:

First, it concerns the overlooking of the “audi alteram partem” (hear the other part) principle, which slightly bewildered us. Why did you introverted into a confined and isolated circle with this Moldovan governance and don’t envisage speaking with the genuine opposition, civil society and free press?

Mr Candu today represents at most 3% of the Moldova society – how about the other 97% of the Moldovans, who are firmly against the gang represented by Mr Candu at this forum? Do you admit they are worthy of being heard too?

2. Language:

As regards the modern days’ Moldova, we clearly cannot afford to be both frank and polite in the same time with the current insidious government if we care about the truth. Regretfully, the diplomats have preferred the second (to be polite to Moldovan governance) and neglected the first (the truth). Another mere exchange with “diplomatic clichés” doesn't help and only maintains the veil over the truth about the situation in Moldova. Actually, such an indulging panel discussion doesn't address any problem.

Therefore we’ve deliberately chosen a non-sophisticated, colloquial and simple language, stripped of elusive and equivocal diplomatic rhetoric. We’re doing so only to ensure that this time the truth is not overlooked again, and we’re convinced that Germany is the right tribune for such a straightforward and sincere discussion.

Most of our statements are framed as questions. We’ll let you scrutinise and answer them by yourselves. As to our perception, the truth about Moldova slowly, gradually and partly begins to percolates to the EU, Germany and other European countries, but you are still far from the truth, being too long misled and cheated by the cunning gang at power in Moldova. In our view, this meeting ought to focus on one single title: the truth about Moldova.

B. “Moldova between EU and Russia” 

This is twofold:

• firstly, what is the Russian impact over nowadays Moldova, and how much has the Kremlin effectively impinged to deteriorate the situation in Moldova?, and
• secondly, what does Russian propaganda really imply in Moldova and through what channels is poured through?

 At the end of this section, we intend to get to the question “Do you still think so?”

1. Russian impact over Moldova

Seven years ago, in 2009, over 80% of the Moldovans were firmly in favour of the European Union. Today this figure has dropped below 30%. What happened to 50% (half of the population!) to turn from ardent EU supporters to ardent EU opposers, within the recent seven years? It is such an essential question, that we feel obligated to re-frame it below ― otherwise, how can we address an issue if we don’t even see it?

• Thus, you take a largely pro-EU country seven years ago, invest over six billion euros (no other country enjoyed such a huge financial aid per capita), grant unconstrained political support, and afterwards you get an anti-EU country, which regards the EU as an entity that backs up and finances mafia in Moldova? Put simply, the EU worked hard to buy antipathy towards itself, on its own taxpayers’ money and political support.

Now come the questions:

• How do these unpalatable facts fit your expectations? Doesn’t it look that you have stoked the train in the opposite direction? Who takes the credit for such disastrous results?
• Has Russia intervened so far? ― No, it hasn’t. Has Russia invested a single cent (in contrast to €6 billion of the EU’s aid) in Moldova? ― No, it hasn’t. What else hasn’t done Russia in Moldova? ― It hasn’t let itself associated with the most despised individual in Moldova, whose personal rating exceeds (minus) -98% (you can hardly imagine a suchlike). Namely, with Vladimir Plahotniuc (or Vlad Ulinici, by his second identity, who also detains Russian citizenship), coincidentally the party boss of Mr Candu, coincidentally the godfather of Mr Candu (here we haven’t used the word “godfather” metaphorically).

Assume you are Kremlin, and assume you have a vested interest in the 80%-pro-EU Moldova ― what would you do? You would let the EU associate itself with the most hated individual: each snapshot of Plahotniuc or his cronies with the EU officials, each hand-shaking with the EU representatives, each financial instalment to save and bailout the most repugnant and unpopular government will inevitably entrench disappointment and irritation, and hence will transfer voters to the anti-EU opposition. And this is what was done, and worked. As simple as that: tell us who’s your friend and we’ll tell you who’re you.

2. Russian propaganda

With regard to the Russian propaganda in Moldova, just three quick clarifying questions for your better comprehension and assessment:

• Are you aware that the Russian TV channels are broadcast in Moldova by a local TV holding, owned by Mr Candu’s party boss and godfather, namely Vladimir Plahotniuc, and that this holding covers over 80%?
• Do you know that, while Mr Candu is feigning an ostansible pro-EU position in front of you, his party boss’ TV holding, along with the entire administrative resource at Plahotniuc’s behest, has propped up and promoted Mr Dodon (the pro-Kremlin candidate) in the last presidential elections? In fact, Plahotniuc made a president of Dodon as a scarecrow for you, here in EU, so that Mr Candu now can purport playing the “pro-European”, somehow opposed to Dodon.
• Do you know that, just as another example, the Broadcasting Council (which is also under the exclusive control of Mr Candu’s party boss) hastened to provide Mr Dodon with new licences for his aggressively anti-EU propaganda?

We find the foregoing cogently and exhaustively illustrative.

Now come the questions:

• Don’t you have the impression that you are told by the cunning Moldovan governance what you are supposed to want to hear, and what absolves them by the principle of the bigger and lesser evil? However, the depicted “bigger” evil is imaginary, while the purportedly “lesser” one (Plahotniuc) is real.
• Don’t you see how brazenly and primitively you are manipulated? And please note, this “geopolitical” masquerade is crafted and shaped particularly for you (here in the EU) rather than for Moldovans ― the figurative “Russian tanks” can hardly be used to scare the Moldovans. They are so disparate that they will gladly accept any foreign “occupation”, be it by Russian, European or Martian armies, only to see their country liberated from the unbearable mafiotic yoke, here represented by Plahotniuc's adjutant, Mr Candu.
• Surprisingly, but “bad Russians” prove a feeble argument for the Moldovans in comparison to the local mafia, currently associated with the EU. To escape the Plahotniuc’s clique, the people have started nostalgically regretting the communist regime and the USSR, against which they had fought earlier.

3. Back to the key question

How can we explain the advantages of the EU under these circumstances, when the EU brought them “Plahotniuc” and keeps bolstering him? The situation will further impair when Mr Candu will brag of this Berlin meeting in the Moldovan press, asserting that you back him in all the wrongdoings and malfeasance his gang is ceaselessly perpetrating. As earlier envisaged, let’s go back now to the key question on the “epic struggle of the current governance for the EU and against the Russian influence” ― are you still comfortable to think so?

Let's recap:

In Moldova, the EU happened to homogenise itself with Plahotniuc (the most despised thug on spot and neighbourhood) and hence discredited itself, while Plahotniuc is providing Russian propaganda and has recently established the anti-EU President Dodon. We have deliberately mentioned Plahotniuc rather than Candu, as the latter is literally nobody but a mere puppet to entertain you today ― the only master is his godfather, and the country is being run from his private office rather than from the Parliament or Government.

C. “Reforms“ 

1. Kernel

After the next sentence we must make a pause to let this simple insight penetrate you: with people like Candu, you discuss the reforms with the ones who are the very cause why the reforms are critically required.

2. Same people

Don’t you have a déjà vu ― seven years you discuss reforms with the same people (including Candu)? They coax and fox you, and everything ends up with cocktails like the today’s ones, and literally nothing more. Aren’t you sick of these primitive manipulation and hollow tales? After seven years of their unlimited power, you are told that the reforms are (again!) looming on the horizon, while the spooky horizon moves away faster than we approach it.

Even if there were some slight cosmetic reshuffles within the last seven years, they’ve been done amongst the same inner circle ― the same gang led by Plahotniuc. For instance, both Mr Candu and his party’s comrade, Prime Minister Filip, are at power in highest executive or parliamentary positions since 2010. So, the persons from whom you are expecting reforms are the ones solely in charge for the last seven years and solely accountable for the disaster nowadays. Have we got it across to you?

For instance, Candu, as vice-prime-minister, along with the ex-prime-minister Leanca, were the proponents and ones of the signatories of the heist of one billion dollars from the National Reserves (to which Germany and the EU contributed significantly and which amounts to roughly 17% of the Moldovan GDP!), as well as of the transfer of the Chisinau International Airport (the only such airport in Moldova) to the Russians (without a single cent paid in return). Now, do you expect Mr Candu to plead for an independent Prosecutor General to allow him investigate these crimes? Don’t you see that you await reforms from the ones, for whom any disruption of the current status quo is the shortest path to jail?

Speaking in Germany with various people, we’ve often heard that all Moldovans and Moldova as a whole are an utter bewilderment, a fuss, a mess, an incessant turbulence. Don’t you catch yourselves that you’ve been speaking selectively and only to Plahotniuc’s emissaries, thoroughly cherry-picked and sent to you on mission (like Corman and Leanca earlier, or Candu and Filip now)? When have you last time listened to the opposition (which is the prevalent majority)? We assume never, nor was it planned for today.

3. Diplomatic message

We often hear from the EU diplomats that the “reforms stalled” or are “lagging behind even the most protracted expectations”; that the Moldovan government has to “accelerate their implementation”. It reveals either the excessively elusive diplomatic language or the striking lack of understanding of the Moldovan reality. The key reforms (in judiciary!) have been never started so that you can now urge their “acceleration”. Instead, the anti-reforms are ongoing even as we speak ― if few years ago Moldova was underway to a captured state, now it is a fait accompli, while you are still conned into talks about never-intended “reforms”.

4. Key test

There is a simple unambiguous test to check Mr Candu’s honesty and sincerity:

• to ask him to accept a Prosecutor General from (say) Germany or Romanian DNA; to accept the Chairman of the Supreme Court from the Netherlands or Sweden; a Minister of Justice from Belgium.

This is what the opposition insists on for a long time. Or, at least, to accept candidates, agreed with EU in compliance with European standards of integrity and independence. This can be done today and doesn’t require a single cent of financing or a single word of legislative amendments.

The big problem is that an independent Prosecutor General is also the shortest path for Mr Candu and his party boss and godfather Plahotniuc to be brought to justice and subsequently to jail, along with other notorious representatives of the so-called “Democratic Party” (the name is ironical, as inside Moldova they are dubbed more adequately as “criminal organised group”).

5. Simulation, imitation and fog in your eyes

What would you do if you were expected to deliver reforms, while those reforms are pernicious for you? Yes, you would muddle and confuse the interlocutors with “conceptions”, “drafts”, “legislative initiatives”, “expertise” and “projects of legal amendments”. This is precisely what Candu is charged with ― to confuse the EU with heroic work on papers, for over seven years now.

But let’s lift the fog around the “legislation issue” (Candu’s favourite trick and ruse):

The same legal frame applied before the raider attacks and the before the heist of 17% of Moldovan GDP. The legislation has nothing to do with the crimes, perpetrated by this government the last seven years ― the legislation wasn’t permissive. Neither then, nor today. Moreover, you’ll be surprised to learn that the Moldovan legislation is not worse than the German or French one, being largely copied from these two. Put simply, legislation is not an issue ― the ones who misuse and abuse it is the issue.

Speaking about “improving the legislation”, would you catch a thief and, instead of punishing him by applying the law, you would kindly ask the culprit to prepare “concept of legislative amendments so that there will be no more robberies and villains in the world”? And this is exactly what the EU is demanding from the current Moldovan government, happily for the latter.

Don’t the EU and IMF see that now they are providing new instalments to the ones who had stolen the previous tranches, and that the new instalments are meant to cover the hole, produced by the previous embezzlements? This is the gist of the queer relationship (better say mockery) between EU and Moldovan kleptocratic authorities ― the EU pays new money, to the same thieves, to cover the previous embezzlements, and calls it “stabilisation”.

However, some amendments to the legislation have been applied by this governance though. For instance, earlier, there have been insurmountable restrictions, preventing frauds in banking sector. Mr Candu has secretly removed them by way of “amendments to the banking legislation”, allowing his godfather to steal overnight ≈80% of the banking and insurance sectors (in Moldova this form of organised crime is called “raider attacks”). This is what Mr Candu calls “legislative improvements”; and now he is laying down new flamboyant speeches about “system bailout package” to be covered by the EU’s taxpayers.

6. “Fight” against corruption

As a rule, by corruption we perceive some petty bribes or favours meant to facilitate certain decision. This common definition doesn't apply to the situation in Moldova. It is not mere corruption when the Prosecutor General is commanded by phone and told against whom to fabricate criminal cases; when the judges are instructed what legal owners to divest of their assets and transfer into some offshores (which turned out to be ultimately owned by Plahotniuc). It is noteworthy that in many of such operations Mr Candu participated and signed personally, like in those of cashing stolen assets in Amsterdam.

7. Oligarchs or oligarch

We used to refer to the Belarusian President Lukashenko by his nickname "the last dictator in Europe" (a sort of his “nom de guerre”). This information is patently obsolete whereas in the meantime, in the Lukashenko's vicinity, a new dictator has arisen. In stark contrast to Lukashenko, this time Plahotniuc is brought up on the EU’s money and political support.

Look outside the window ― there are German taxpayers walking out there, who believe that their government has good purposes to aid Moldova, and these worthwhile purposes are not “bringing up new dictators”, nor are they enforcing the culture of impunity, egregious debauchery and outrageous disdain for the rule of law. The EU’s taxpayers don’t conceive that new instalments (from their taxes) can be granted to the same thieves, who earlier had stolen the previous instalments and even robbed the National Reserves of their own country.

We often reiterate the Edmund Burke’s maxim “The only thing necessary for the triumph of evil is for good men to do nothing.” This is an unpalatable truth ― we are guilty for the wrongdoings, as are we for not opposing to the wrongdoings. However, in Moldova is even worse: not only has the EU turned the blind eye on Moldovan government’s wrongdoings, the EU has also raised a dictator on EU money, so that new taxpayers’ money will be subsequently required to fight him later.

As concerns “oligarchs”, it is really bizarre how diplomats manage to speak hours about modern Moldova without mentioning the name of Plahotniuc. It is like speaking about the plague in medieval Europe without ever mentioning the word “plague”. Imagine how ludicrous and suspect do these word look to the Moldovans.

One more remark on “oligarchs”, especially using this term at plural insofar as it concerns Moldova: unlike other countries (say, Ukraine), in Moldova there is only one oligarch (Plahotniuc) ― there is no other, no second, no third one, who holds control over the state institutions (judiciary, prosecution, government, Parliament, Anticorruption Centre, National Bank, etc.). Every time the foreign diplomats mention “oligarchs” at plural it denotes they are not familiar with the Moldovan specific or they deliberately blur the central role of Plahotniuc.

Vladimir Socor, Jamestown Foundation, Washington, 6 October 2016:

“Plahotniuc is not even an oligarch, as oligarchy is a group system. He is the master, who concentrated the financial and political power in his hands. [...] The party (PDM) led de facto by Plahotniuc and completely dependent on his financing obtained judiciary and law-enforcing institutions. Since then, the persons nominated by Plahotniuc are controlling the Prosecutor General's Office, National Anticorruption Centre, National Integrity Commission, regulatory agencies for economics, Ministry of Economy, and key positions in leading state-owned economic institutions. [...] The fundamental issue is the state captured by Plahotniuc, who controls the political and economic system without having any constitutional or legal responsibility. It is an informal master.”

http://www.ziare.com/europa/moldova/tragedia-din-moldova-statul-kompromatului-cele-mai-detestate-cuvinte-sunt-astazi-reforma-si-europa-interviu-1439052

Kalman Mizsei, EU diplomat, former EU representative in Moldova, Free Europe, 4 October 2016:

“The Republic of Moldova is in an unusual situation, because all the power is in the hands of one person. We must regard these elections through the question: how can we regain the power, concentrated in the hands of one man, in the hands of Mr Plahotniuc?”

http://www.europalibera.org/a/28030562.html

Frankfurter Allgemeine, “A different sort of bank robbery” by Karl-Peter Schwarz, 18 February 2015:

“The super-oligarch Plahotniuc secured control of the justice system for himself, including the Prosecutor General’s office and the Anti-Corruption Centre (NAC). […]  The Liberals had insisted that the post of Prosecutor General be conferred on an independent prosecutor from one of the EU countries. But this was out of the question for Filat and Plahotniuc.”

http://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/ausland/europa/wahl-in-moldau-entscheidung-zwischen-eu-und-russland-13290118.html

Wiener Zeitung, „Republic of Moldova: I am the State (Der Staat bin ich) - How the unelected Vlad Plahotniuc governs the Republic of Moldova”, by Eva Konzett, 18 May 2016:

“Moldovans don’t believe in the paranormal. For them, the invisible hand has a name: Vlad Plahotniuc, the country’s richest entrepreneur and president of the Democratic Party. He controls everything. He has never held elected office. [...] Plahotniuc exploited his position to secure his influence in the state and to tap resources.”

http://www.wienerzeitung.at/nachrichten/europa/europastaaten/819034_Der-Staat-bin-ich.html

The Hill, Washington, Dr Theodore Karasik, Lexington Institute, 3 July 2016:

“Vladimir Plahotniuc, the only Moldovan oligarch [...] „privatized” the Democratic Party, the Parliament coalition, the courts, the Anti-Corruption Commission, Commission for National Integrity, Prosecutor General’s office, and the police. State capture is complete. [...] The U.S. (and Europe) should support clean presidential and parliamentary elections. That means, no odious politicians, such as Plahotniuc, to be viable candidates for top public offices.”

http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/foreign-policy/286262-moldovas-tywin-lannister


8. Conditions

The EU has ascertained that no promise, agreement or commitment of the Moldovan authorities is fulfilled (or barely remembered) after they receive the financial funds. Given that seven-year-long experience, the EU sought to condition the further financial support. In a very formal, general, philosophical and clumsy manner, thus allowing the cunning governance to dissemble “some statistical performance” by making apparent “progresses” in certain domains ― exclusively in the fields, which don’t affect the Plahotniuc’s grip over the law-enforcing and coercive sectors (judiciary, public prosecution, Anticorruption Centre, Police).

Hence the rampant dichotomy: the population feels the life is getting relentlessly worse, while the governmental reports display formal “progress”. Here we want to make three remarks, or propositions of certain further rules:

1. If there are no reforms in judiciary, there are no reforms at all ― if judiciary and prosecution are not independent, everything else is just sheer and misleading demagoguery;
2. To condition the EU assistance with more than one condition (which is to properly address the judiciary and the rule of law) means not to condition at all. At least, for the time being. The crafty governance will gladly fulfil any other secondary “condition” to bluff and report a certain performance. If, besides judiciary, you add another condition, the Moldovan government will proudly report 50% of progress. For now, they report 90% or so ― it is easy to guess what “reforms” are in those 10%, which are not fulfilled and neither ever intended to.
   
   Note: Of course, this rule won’t compel the current governance to reforms in the judiciary and rule of law, but at the least it will cogently show to the EU the real progress marker of reforms ― which is null (zero!). At least, you won’t allow the swindlers and cheaters to further hoodwink you; you’ll be no longer bamboozled by “constructive discussions” with people that “reconfirmed their firm commitments”, like Candu, Filip or other Plahotniuc’s cronies, accomplices and emissaries;
3. The reforms in judiciary and Prosecutor General's Office, which don't imply the change of the heads of institutions, not only are futile, but also undermine the very hope and belief in reforms. We must remind that neither the institutions, nor the legal frames are those committing the crimes, abuses, arbitrariness and malfeasance; but concrete individuals. If you maintain them, you perpetuate the problem rather than tackle it, regardless of how much the legal framework reportedly changes. The new heads of judiciary and public prosecution must be agreed with the EU according to the European standards of integrity and compliance.

D. Conclusions 

Preface to the conclusions: Sooner or later, Plahotniuc and his gang (including his godson Candu) will inevitably face the due prosecution and justice, to be carried out according to the EU standards. When it will be brought about, it will signify that the situation in Moldova really changes, like it has earlier changed in the adjacent Romania. We believe it inevitably ought to happen, because Moldova and Moldovans are no exceptions: all regimes and junta-like governances ended up with a tribunal.

1. Captured state

We face the phenomenon of captive state, as clearly indicated by Thorbjørn Jagland, Secretary General of the Council of Europe. We quote from his statement:

“The state is still in the hands of oligarchs. [...] The government must immediately begin purging corrupt officials from public bodies. [...] As a start, the dozens of judges — some very high-profile — who have been accused of egregiously abusing their power should be investigated. [...] The Anti-Corruption Center, the National Integrity Commission and the General Prosecutor’s Office must be set on an independent footing. [...] This captured state must be returned to its citizens.”

http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/11/opinion/bring-moldova-back-from-the-brink.html?_r=1   (It was stated a year ago and is even truer today)

2. The key problem

In Moldova, the key state institutions, meant to enshrine and protect the rule of law, are the most brutal transgressors of these fundamental norms. The big robberies and expropriations, the raider attacks, the mockery of human rights and the rule of law, the largest crimes are being committed by the judges and prosecutors. In Moldova, if you want to complain against the perpetrators, you may complain only to the same perpetrators, i.e. to your own executioners. This is the pyramid built and harnessed by Plahotniuc, the godfather of Mr Candu.

Dismantling and demolishing this criminal pyramid should be the primordial target of the EU if it really wants to help Moldova ― this is the red line the EU has to determine itself which part it is on: the criminal gang that hijacked the state institutions or the hostages (the people of Moldova). If the EU fails to address the core problem, and if you keep emanating “signs of partnership” with the clique at power, the people of Moldova will treat the EU as an accomplice. This destructive effect has already made itself blatantly visible in the drop of EU popularity from 80% to 30% ― it also makes clear how large the population turning from ardent pro-EU to ardent anti-EU is.

3. Central and secondary issues

If there is no rule of law, if there is no respect for human rights, there is nothing to discuss about some “secondary importance items of the EU-Moldova agenda”. Any usurper (and Plahotniuc, through his henchman Candu, is no exception) will tend to impose peripheral subjects in order to distract your attention and feign a “collaboration”, as long as you don't challenge his control over the repressive organs (judiciary, public prosecution and similar coercive agencies). Don’t let yourselves dragged and embroiled in secondary issues until the core one (law-enforcing sector) remains unaddressed.

4. Show attitude

It is an optical illusion that the EU may attain some loftier sublime goals (be them geopolitical or intergalactic) by bargaining and flirting with dictators at the expense of the human rights of the people and the rule of law in the country; and by repudiating your own European fundamental principles, on which countries like Germany are raised.

It doesn’t suffice to have a principled attitude, it is also crucially necessary to show it, to make it manifestly visible to Moldovans. Start today. Don’t postpone being on the right side. Nowadays Moldova has political prisoners, victims of raider attacks and fabricated cases against the opposers to the regime ― don’t keep turning the blind eye on them only to preserve the bureaucratic comfort and avoid annoying the perpetrator, the abuser, the offender and the master of the gang, namely Plahotniuc, here represented by his godson Candu.

5. What part the EU is on?

As you probably know, after the collapse of the USSR and of the communist regime, fragile incipient and vulnerable democracies has been exposed to the assaults of post-communist gangs eager to grab the power. In the Baltic states the gangs failed, in Moldova they succeeded. Nevertheless, even under such historical cataclysms, we keep wondering: what has our people done so wrong, that the EU punishes them by taking the part of their oppressors, of the junta, disguised under the pro-EU veneer? Aren’t the today’s meeting, the later cocktails and photo-session with Mr Candu another proof of which part the EU is on?

Final words:

We crave a genuinely European future for our country, dominated by the rule of law and the respect of human rights. We want our country in the EU ― this is why we must start with the truth. One of the subjects of this discussion is “how to adjust the Eastern Partnership?” ― in Moldova, this partnership lacks truth and fairness ― first and foremost, before anything else, adjust it with truth and fairness.